The Euromaidan protests that took place during winter 2013–2014, in Ukraine, have cast their shadow over Tajikistan. The short-term effect of the protests (particularly the Russian response), along with the increasingly violent and intractable nature of the civil war in Syria, makes comparable protests unlikely in Tajikistan in the near to medium term. However, this has not kept some from trying.
Earlier this month, the opposition figure Umarali Quvatov called for protests to take place in Dushanbe on October 10. Quvatov, the exiled leader of the now banned opposition organization “Group 24,” enjoys limited popularity, and the protests failed to materialize. Despite Quvatov’s lack of broad appeal, the government responded to his call by beefing up security in the capital and blocking websites and text message services. Some media outlets reported that President Emomali Rahmon even invited 800 Chinese troops into the capital to help suppress potential protests, although it remains unclear if these allegations are true or simply misinformation emanating from Quvatov and his camp (BBC Tajiki, October 13).
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Incidents this past year in the semi-autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan (see EDM, April 29) have demonstrated that the regime is willing to use lethal force to suppress public displays of dissent, which may further dampen the appetite for protest. One of the most widely cited reasons for the unlikelihood of protests is the fact that a significant percentage of Tajikistan’s military-age men live in Russia as migrant laborers. If this diversion of manpower does prove to be a crucial factor in forestalling protest movements in Tajikistan, it might prove a pyrrhic victory for the regime for three reasons:First, over the long run, the domestic economic hardships that drive Tajikistani laborers to Russia in search of work may exacerbate their underlying grievances against the regime. This would particularly be the case if a sudden change in Russian migration policy led to quotas or deportations that drastically reduced the number of Tajikistani migrants. Despite its reliance on cheap labor, Russia has a long history of threatening such actions as a way of extracting concessions from Dushanbe. A sudden and large repatriation of Tajikistani migrant labors with no means of supporting their families would have negative consequences for regime stability.
Second, long-term mass labor migration has considerable effects on Tajikistani social—and by extension—political dynamics. While regionalism, entrenched patronage networks, and loyalty to local strong men have hampered Rahmon’s ability to fully consolidate power in a centralized government, the existence of local power brokers do at least provide him with a finite (and familiar) number of interlocutors to deal with in times of crisis. Recent history is replete with examples of Rahmon using a combination of threats and inducements to compel local strong men to bring themselves (and their constituents) into line. Mass labor migration, however, may erode traditional patronage networks and regional identities, thereby degrading the ability of local strong men to “deliver” their constituents. The aforementioned Mirzohuja Ahmadov, who rejected calls for domestic street protests in Tajikistan, is a prime example of the trajectory of a regional war lord–turned Rahmon ally. A reader response to an interview with Ahmadov on Radio Free Europe’s Tajik-language website, however, is indicative of the potentially evolving sentiment of migrant laborers: “Mr. Ahmadov, do not speak for all of the Gharmis, I am a migrant in Moscow and I support Umarali Quvatov one hundred percent” (Ozodi, October 11). “Gharmis” refers to people who live in, or trace their lineage back to, the region of Gharm in Tajikistan.
And third, the process of de-regionalization and the leveling of local political hierarchies could be a force for good as it opens the door for competing political and religious ideas. However, recent reports of Tajikistani citizens being radicalized in Russia and recruited to fight with the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—ISIS) show how dangerous ideas can also metastasize in these communities (RFE/RL, October 2; see EDM August 7, 2013).
Since the start of the anti-government protests in Ukraine, and the ensuing Russian invasion of the country, the Ukraine crisis has raised a great deal of apprehension inside Tajikistan. And in large part due the population’s distrust of mass protests as a spark for anarchy, combined possibly with the large number of young Tajikistani men working in Russia, so far mass protest movements have not materialized. Yet, the country’s economic reliance on labor migration to Russia, the political effect of mass labor migration on traditional patronage networks, as well as concerns of greater ease of extremist ideology spreading through inter-mixed uprooted communities could help reverse this situation over the long term. All these factors call for more careful scrutiny, as it is possible that the reasons that have made Euromaidan-style protests in Tajikistan unlikely in the short term could lead to more radical and violent opposition in the medium to long term.
Category: Law
Torture still widespread in Tajikistan 20 years after the country acceded to anti-torture treaty / February 10, 2015 / Reports and Publications / OMCT
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) came into force in Tajikistan on 10 February 1995. By acceding to the treaty, the authorities of Tajikistan pledged to protect everybody under their jurisdiction from torture and other forms of ill-treatment, to reflect in law and practice the principles enshrined in the Convention, to cooperate with the Committee against Torture and to implement its recommendations.
But twenty years later, torture and impunity for it remain widespread in the country. From 2011 to 2014, members of the NGO Coalition against Torture in Tajikistan documented more than 100 cases of men, women and children who were allegedly subjected to torture or other ill-treatment. Perpetrators were brought to justice only in exceptional cases. The human rights groups jointly issuing this statement believe that many victims of torture did not file complaints for fear of reprisals.
Heightened international attention to torture in Tajikistan in recent years and thorough study of the situation by international human rights bodies and mechanisms including the Committee against Torture and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Special Rapporteur on torture) resulted in the issuing of a set of recommendations to the authorities.
On the twentieth anniversary of the treaty entering into force in Tajikistan, the human rights groups jointly issuing this public statement published a briefing, entitled “Tajikistan needs to do more to end torture,” which provides an up-to-date overview of the current situation of torture or other forms of ill-treatment, including in the army.
Noteworthy positive steps taken by Tajikistan in recent years include introducing an article on torture in the Criminal Code (Article 143) with a definition of torture that is in line with that contained in the Convention against Torture. As a result, by 2014, four criminal cases under this article were opened; and the courts ordered compensation to the families of two men who had died as a result of torture.
Tajikistan: Opposition Leader Detained in Turkey | EurasiaNet.org
An exiled Tajik opposition leader who heads a group Dushanbe classifies as “extremist” has reportedly been detained in Turkey.
Umarali Quvvatov’s wife told RFE/RL’s Tajik service December 20 of a raid on the family’s Istanbul home the day before. She said his passport and computers were confiscated and a group of guests was also detained. Turkish officials have not commented.
Quvvatov is a former oil trader and business partner of Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon’s son-in-law. He now heads the anti-government and social media-savvy Gruppa 24. Though it appears to have little popular following at home in Tajikistan, the group of exiles has made authorities edgy in recent months.
This is the second time Quvvatov has been nabbed by a foreign government, likely at Dushanbe’s request. In December 2012 he was arrested in Dubai on accusations of mass fraud raised by the Rakhmon regime before being released without explanation in September 2013. Quvvatov calls the charges politically motivated.
Quvvatov has applied for asylum in Turkey. Nadejda Atayeva, France-based leader of the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, has called on Ankara to respect the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR). Steve Swerdlow of Human Rights Watch told EurasiaNet.org that HRW “is closely following the situation.”
Quvvatov “faces a serious risk of politically motivated persecution, including torture or other forms of ill-treatment” if returned to Tajikistan, Swerdlow said.
Tajikistan: Opposition Leader Detained in Turkey | EurasiaNet.org.
Russia’s ruble collapse shakes Central Asian neighbours
While people in Moscow are already queueing outside foreign exchange shops to get rid of the ruble, eyeing the current 9.1% price inflation rate, neighbours of the “Russian bear” are likely trembling in fear.
Until a year ago, the Russian economy was flying high on the wings of a seemingly endless oil-fuelled boom, which showered economic migrants with hard cash to send back to their origin country. With the economic depression on the horizon and investors pulling their money out of the country by the billion each month, Russian companies have already started cutting wages and making redundancies.
Poor former Soviet republics with a troubled recent past like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are suffering the most. Millions of Tajik migrants live in Russia and send much of their salary back home. According to World Bank data, remittances in Tajikistan make up 42.1 % of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, making it the world’s biggest recipient.
A staggering 60% of those remittances come from Russia. If we consider that over a million Tajiks – half of the country’s workforce – work in the giant neighbouring country, we see why Russia’s incoming economic depression may potentially wreck those countries.
Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan is in a similarly desperate situation. The small mountainous state has a 32% share of GDP of remittances.
It has been calculated that Tajik growth will slow to 6.5% this year from 7.4% in 2013 as a result of the drop in worker remittances in the January-September period. Both Tajikistan, a state of 8 million, and Kyrgyzstan have a troubled post-soviet past. From 1992 to 1997, a civil war marred the prospect of economic growth in Tajikistan, which borders with Afghanistan and China.
Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat
Uzbekistan continues its quest to choke its two poorer neighbors’ plans to attain and secure energy independence. During an official visit to Kazakhstan late November, Uzbek President Islam Karimov made sure to bring up the “dangers” the hydropower plants Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want to build could pose. According to Karimov, the plans are “not coordinated with countries downstream,” i.e. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Flanked by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Karimov said, “We have affirmed our common position regarding the construction of new hydro technical facilities upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, which must strictly conform to recognized norms of international law and UN conventions as well as mandatory coordination with all countries located in the lower reaches of these rivers.”
Karimov conveniently forgets his administration bills Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for natural gas exports. Moreover, said gas is frequently shut off as a means of coercing the two countries, which are planning to build power-generating facilities on Central Asia’s two largest rivers. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling with not just a shortage but an absence of Uzbek gas, for most of 2014. Because mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sit high above sea level, harsh winters create shortages of already scarce electricity, and any insufficiency of Uzbek gas only makes the two countries more anxious to secure energy independence.
From Russia With Love?
Despite Tashkent’s tactics, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which together own nearly 70 percent of the waters that flow into the dwindling Aral Sea, remain deaf to Uzbekistan’s demands and warnings of “water wars.” This is thanks in part to Russia. The Kremlin has not only been voicing its support for plans to revive the Soviet-era projects, it has actually invested millions of dollars in the idea. Russian President Vladimir Putin personally travelled to Bishkek and Dushanbe, the two regional hosts of Russian military bases, to sign bilateral agreements to that effect. On top of Russia’s support, Tajikistan secured the World Bank’s “green light” for what is expected to be the tallest dam in the world: Rogun at 335 meters. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan was actually able to launch parts of a cascade of Russia-funded hydropower stations.
If giving money and throwing political support behind Kyrgyz and Tajik energy initiatives is the Kremlin’s carrot, the stick it may wish to use can hit both sides of the conflict. Toughening conditions for millions of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrant laborers in Russia, thereby indirectly forcing them to return to their homelands, is a tool Moscow has used frequently in the past. And this time around these migrants could thwart Uzbekistan’s attempts to prevent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from building dams. The sanctions the West slapped on Russia for Crimea and Ukraine have obvious implications for millions of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. On top of this, a report the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released in November suggests that falling prices of oil coupled with sanctions will negatively impact the Russian economy next year, sending shockwaves across Central Asia. These factors could lead some migrants to return from Russia, permanently.
The return of even a portion of the migrants to join the growing local populations would put Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under pressure. Ironically, therefore, both sides of the water conflict equally need it: Uzbekistan needs water to keep tens of thousands of returnees busy on agriculture fields, lest they voice discontent with the government’s inability to employ them, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need water to generate electricity to keep their own returning migrants from taking to the streets in protest. No sane Tajik or Kyrgyz politician would back down in the face of such challenges.
Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News
The meltdown of Russia’s currency, brought on by falling oil prices, collapsing confidence in the central government, and international financial sanctions, is now manifesting itself as a panic. It’s “the most incredible currency collapse I think I have ever seen in the 17 years in the market, and 26 years covering Russia,” wrote Timothy Ash, Standard Bank’s head of emerging market research, in a note this morning. “No one expected the ruble to hit 60 this year against the dollar, let alone 70 or 80 even. And no one is positioned for this. This will impart huge short term damage to Russia.”
And the reverberations will be felt beyond the country’s borders, globally, but most acutely by its neighbors, where the oil-fueled Russian boom of the last decade has rained cash upon exporters and economic migrants alike.
Consider Tajikistan. Remittances — cash sent home from citizens working abroad — make up 42% of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, according to World Bank data, with almost 60% of those remittances coming from Russia. In the course of just a few months, the value of those remittances has been chopped in half. The results will be devastating.
Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News.
Beaking the Vase
(Longer version of the previous article)
Breaking the Vase: How women are becoming border guards in Central Asia and Afghanistan | OSCE
The ‘vase’ has been slowly shattering in many countries as law enforcement agencies, somewhat hesitatingly, have opened their doors to women. Border police services are arguably one of the last outposts reluctant to include women in their ranks. The reluctance has often been mutual, with few women relishing postings away from home and family, in isolated and hostile locations, working for long periods alongside large numbers of men.
The strategic shift from viewing border guards as responsible for defence of the state to protection of citizens – and thereby easing the ‘unhampered flow’ of goods, persons and services – has demanded not only reform and expansion but inclusivity. Representative law enforcement institutions have become an operational necessity.
The 21st century has witnessed a massive increase in mobility and the numbers of labour migrants, with more women crossing borders primarily for trade and employment but also for education, marriage and adventure. The vast majority, looking for employment opportunities and the doorway to a better life for their families, are among the poorest, the least educated and skilled women, with limited employment options.
In May 2014, the OSCE Border Management Staff College introduced its first all-women staff course. The course content included the standard topics ranging from management models to information-sharing, migration, human trafficking and smuggling, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption measures, conflict management and leadership. There was also a two-day Train the Trainers session and a requirement for group research and presentation on selected topics.
Participants included twenty-five mid and senior-level female officers of the border, customs and drug control agencies of Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania and Tajikistan.
Breaking the Vase: How women are becoming border guards in Central Asia and Afghanistan | OSCE.
Tajikistan Remains ‘Hell for Gays’ · Global Voices
Over on Global Voices there is a really interesting post and discussion on LGBT rights and discrimination in Tajikistan (hit the link for more):
Gay issues are a taboo subject in Tajikistan. Although the country decriminalized homosexuality fifteen years ago, there is still very little tolerance toward sexual minorities within its conservative society. In addition to homophobic attitudes, those rare individuals who dare to disclose their ‘unconventional’ sexual orientation become easy targets of physical and psychological abuse, including from police (pdf). As a result, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community remains ”one of the most closed and secretive parts of Tajik society”.
A recent discussion in the country’s blogosphere offers a rare glimpse into what it means to be gay in Tajikistan and how the country’s people view members of the LGBT community.
‘It means PAIN…’
The discussion started after blogger Rishdor wrote [ru] about a violent incident at his university. Students there found out that one of their classmates was a gay. Rishdor writes [ru]:
Как-то все восприняли это как личную обиду. Гомика решили проучить. Человек 8 однокурсников избили его в туалете. Жестоко избили, у него все лицо и костюм были в крови…
For some reason, everyone took it as a personal offence. It was decided that the [gay] should be taught a lesson. About eight of our classmates beat him up in the bathroom. They beat him up badly; there was a lot of blood on his face and clothes…
Tajikistan: Executive Order Disregards Collective Wisdom | EurasiaNet.org
Tajikistan is turning ageism into state policy. Supposedly seeking to “attract young specialists” into government service, the president’s office has instructed officials to lay off elderly government employees –including teachers, doctors at state hospitals, and office functionaries – regardless of their qualifications.
Critics fear the policy will exacerbate the decline of Tajikistan’s intellectual capital. The December 6 order covers those who are old enough to qualify for pensions – 63 for men and 58 for women. Signed by the president’s chief of staff, former Justice Minister Bakhtiyor Khudoyorov, the order is designed to “accelerate the use of modern technologies, especially in the area of e-governance.”
Telecommunications engineer Ilkhom Shomuddinov, 64, is among those affected. He has worked for the state for more than 40 years. “Believe it or not, I don’t remember taking a single sick day. Now, I am told that I am dismissed – they [the managers] follow instructions from above. They don’t know whom to replace me with. Even if they manage to find a young specialist with my qualifications, it is unlikely he would work for that joke of a salary,” Shomuddinov told EurasiaNet.org.
Government wages are paltry: High school teachers earn about $70 per month, doctors between $100 and $200, and secretaries between $100 and $150.
But pensions (a form of social security issued to all, regardless of where a pensioner worked) are more difficult to live on, not only because they are smaller, but because they do not afford one the opportunity to use his or her official position to earn extra income (teachers offer their students private lessons, doctors see patients outside of office hours, and bureaucrats pocket bribes). The order effectively condemns many older workers to poverty. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, there are 590,000 pensioners in Tajikistan; the average monthly pension is 152 somoni (less than $32).
Judging from reactions in local media, the order is deeply unpopular. Some legal experts argue it not only undermines Tajiks’ constitutional rights, but also their human rights according to international law.
Multiple attempts to discuss the order with officials at the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection and the president’s office failed. Officials repeatedly transferred calls to phones that went unanswered.
In response to media criticism, during a January 7 press conference Education Minister Nuriddin Saidov promised “no dismissals will be carried out in the educational system in relation to the age of employees,” the Asia-Plus news agency quoted him as saying. “Many workers who have reached the pension age are qualified and experienced cadre, and we need them [as badly] as we need the air.”
Yet layoffs in the education system, which the minister oversees, have occurred. In early January, Khujand State University dismissed 11 professors who had passed retirement age, the Avesta news agency reported. At Kulyab State University, 23 elderly teachers have reportedly been laid off.
Government sources say they are faced with a dilemma: Ignore authoritarian President Imomali Rahmon’s order and face punishment from the chief executive’s office, or replace aging specialists with unqualified and untested young people who have come up through the dilapidated post-Soviet education system. “On the one hand, we cannot ignore instructions from the president’s office; on the other hand, it would be a crime to fire professors. Who will train young doctors then? Both the education and health sectors have decayed during the years of independence and the civil war,” said a source in the Health Ministry’s Education Department, speaking on condition of anonymity because of a fear of retaliation.
via Tajikistan: Executive Order Disregards Collective Wisdom | EurasiaNet.org.