Silk Road Reporters

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March, Western nations have imposed sanctions on Russia, including on its financial and energy sectors, as well as on a number of Russian nationals in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. In response, on Aug. 6 Putin imposed year-long food bans on the United States, European Union member states, Australia, Canada and Norway. Russia has also banned the transit of agricultural goods from Belarus and Kazakhstan following its embargo on EU food imports.

From the $43 billion of agricultural products Russia purchased abroad in 2013, $25 billion are now banned. According to Russian statistics, imports accounted for about 40 percent of household spending on food.

For the older Russian consumers this echoes memories of empty Soviet supermarkets, while the ban will likely spur inflation, currently hovering at about 7 percent this year.

Silk Road Reporters.

BMC supported expeditions – what was achieved in 2014?

In 2014 the BMC International Committee awarded a total of £14,250 to 16 expeditions, and an additional three awards from the Julie Tullis Memorial fund. Supported trips visited South America, Greenland and various regions in Asia, with mixed success.

Notably, there were a number of ambitious projects, with some of our most talented climbers attempting objectives that could rightly be called “cutting edge” in current alpinisim.

In general the usual factors of weather and conditions prevented them achieving their goals.

But they were certainly not alone: compared to recent years, 2014 saw very few outstanding climbs accomplished in the world’s mountains.

BMC supported expeditions – what was achieved in 2014?.

Russia Bolstering Presence In Central Asia: Threats And Opportunities For Iran – Analysis – Eurasia Review

Russia has been habitually critical of the United States’ unilateral policies in the region. On the outward, Russia has been apparently following a multilateral policy at international level and has been encouraging the United States to follow suit by adopting similar policies. However, when it comes to Central Asia and Caucasus, Russia has been itself pursuing totally unilateral policies. Russia’s political behavior in this regard has been an obstacle to multilateral cooperation with such Asian countries as India, Iran and China. Moscow is actually willing to bolster its own influence in this region. Although Russia has close ties with a country like China, its major policy and measures taken by Moscow in the strategic regions of Central Asia and Caucasus have been largely unilateral.

Russia Bolstering Presence In Central Asia: Threats And Opportunities For Iran – Analysis – Eurasia Review.

Ruble Collapse a Problem for Central Asia | The Diplomat

Since October 9, the first day in post-Soviet history that the ruble-to-dollar exchange rate climbed above 40, the Russian currency was consistently hammered, until it managed to end last week’s rollercoaster below 60. Post-Soviet economies to the South of Russia have been hit by the financial crisis in Moscow. Although Central Asian trade with Russia is declining, in favor of a surge in business with China, all countries in Central Asia still maintain strong economic relations with Russia. This means that any crisis in Russia is immediately felt in Central Asia.

The two poorest economies in Central Asia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are also among the most Russia-dependent in the entire post-Soviet space. Dushanbe and Bishkek’s budgets depend heavily on remittances from migrant workers living in Russia. The ruble, together with the dollar, is widely available in both countries and exchange rates are a significant indicator of the stability of their economies. With the ruble crumbling, Tajikistan’s somoni has reacted very slowly on the official market: The increase against the dollar since October 9 has been just below 3 percent. However, it is worth noting that for four consecutive days last week the official rate hiked almost 4 percent each day before rebounding back to 5.13 somoni per dollar. In the same period, the Kyrgyz som gradually weakened against the dollar, declining 4.5 percent. Notably, for the first time, the som became more valuable than the ruble.

In the past two months alone, the ruble has lost between 55 and 40 percent of its value against the dollar, and has also lost ground against the somoni and som. This could have dangerous consequences for worker remittances from expat Central Asian workers. The Kyrgyz government is preparing for windfalls from abroad to fall by at least $1 billion. The drought in remittances, accompanied by government spending to keep their currencies closer to the dollar, poses a direct threat to the budgets of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

 

Ruble Collapse a Problem for Central Asia | The Diplomat.

Russia’s ruble collapse shakes Central Asian neighbours

While people in Moscow are already queueing outside foreign exchange shops to get rid of the ruble, eyeing the current 9.1% price inflation rate, neighbours of the “Russian bear” are likely trembling in fear.

Until a year ago, the Russian economy was flying high on the wings of a seemingly endless oil-fuelled boom, which showered economic migrants with hard cash to send back to their origin country. With the economic depression on the horizon and investors pulling their money out of the country by the billion each month, Russian companies have already started cutting wages and making redundancies.

Poor former Soviet republics with a troubled recent past like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are suffering the most. Millions of Tajik migrants live in Russia and send much of their salary back home. According to World Bank data, remittances in Tajikistan make up 42.1 % of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, making it the world’s biggest recipient.

A staggering 60% of those remittances come from Russia. If we consider that over a million Tajiks – half of the country’s workforce – work in the giant neighbouring country, we see why Russia’s incoming economic depression may potentially wreck those countries.

Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan is in a similarly desperate situation. The small mountainous state has a 32% share of GDP of remittances.

It has been calculated that Tajik growth will slow to 6.5% this year from 7.4% in 2013 as a result of the drop in worker remittances in the January-September period. Both Tajikistan, a state of 8 million, and Kyrgyzstan have a troubled post-soviet past. From 1992 to 1997, a civil war marred the prospect of economic growth in Tajikistan, which borders with Afghanistan and China.

Russia's ruble collapse shakes Central Asian neighbours.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan improve border co-operation – Central Asia Online

BISHKEK – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are working to reduce periodic disputes over scarce resources on their shared border.

Territorial claims, pastureland and water figure in many disputes, the Kyrgyz State Border Service (GPS) says, adding that it battles cross-border smuggling too. Aware of the potential for trouble, Kyrgyz and Tajik border forces confer regularly.

“In 2014, [they] met more than 80 times,” Gulmira Borubayeva, GPS spokeswoman, said. “They worked to resolve conflicts and clashes that occur in the border regions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.”

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan improve border co-operation – Central Asia Online.

Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat

Uzbekistan continues its quest to choke its two poorer neighbors’ plans to attain and secure energy independence. During an official visit to Kazakhstan late November, Uzbek President Islam Karimov made sure to bring up the “dangers” the hydropower plants Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want to build could pose. According to Karimov, the plans are “not coordinated with countries downstream,” i.e. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Flanked by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Karimov said, “We have affirmed our common position regarding the construction of new hydro technical facilities upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, which must strictly conform to recognized norms of international law and UN conventions as well as mandatory coordination with all countries located in the lower reaches of these rivers.”

Karimov conveniently forgets his administration bills Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for natural gas exports. Moreover, said gas is frequently shut off as a means of coercing the two countries, which are planning to build power-generating facilities on Central Asia’s two largest rivers. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling with not just a shortage but an absence of Uzbek gas, for most of 2014. Because mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sit high above sea level, harsh winters create shortages of already scarce electricity, and any insufficiency of Uzbek gas only makes the two countries more anxious to secure energy independence.

From Russia With Love?

Despite Tashkent’s tactics, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which together own nearly 70 percent of the waters that flow into the dwindling Aral Sea, remain deaf to Uzbekistan’s demands and warnings of “water wars.” This is thanks in part to Russia. The Kremlin has not only been voicing its support for plans to revive the Soviet-era projects, it has actually invested millions of dollars in the idea. Russian President Vladimir Putin personally travelled to Bishkek and Dushanbe, the two regional hosts of Russian military bases, to sign bilateral agreements to that effect. On top of Russia’s support, Tajikistan secured the World Bank’s “green light” for what is expected to be the tallest dam in the world: Rogun at 335 meters. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan was actually able to launch parts of a cascade of Russia-funded hydropower stations.

If giving money and throwing political support behind Kyrgyz and Tajik energy initiatives is the Kremlin’s carrot, the stick it may wish to use can hit both sides of the conflict. Toughening conditions for millions of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrant laborers in Russia, thereby indirectly forcing them to return to their homelands, is a tool Moscow has used frequently in the past. And this time around these migrants could thwart Uzbekistan’s attempts to prevent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from building dams. The sanctions the West slapped on Russia for Crimea and Ukraine have obvious implications for millions of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. On top of this, a report the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released in November suggests that falling prices of oil coupled with sanctions will negatively impact the Russian economy next year, sending shockwaves across Central Asia. These factors could lead some migrants to return from Russia, permanently.

The return of even a portion of the migrants to join the growing local populations would put Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under pressure. Ironically, therefore, both sides of the water conflict equally need it: Uzbekistan needs water to keep tens of thousands of returnees busy on agriculture fields, lest they voice discontent with the government’s inability to employ them, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need water to generate electricity to keep their own returning migrants from taking to the streets in protest. No sane Tajik or Kyrgyz politician would back down in the face of such challenges.

Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat.

Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News

The meltdown of Russia’s currency, brought on by falling oil prices, collapsing confidence in the central government, and international financial sanctions, is now manifesting itself as a panic. It’s “the most incredible currency collapse I think I have ever seen in the 17 years in the market, and 26 years covering Russia,” wrote Timothy Ash, Standard Bank’s head of emerging market research, in a note this morning. “No one expected the ruble to hit 60 this year against the dollar, let alone 70 or 80 even. And no one is positioned for this. This will impart huge short term damage to Russia.”

And the reverberations will be felt beyond the country’s borders, globally, but most acutely by its neighbors, where the oil-fueled Russian boom of the last decade has rained cash upon exporters and economic migrants alike. 

Consider Tajikistan. Remittances — cash sent home from citizens working abroad — make up 42% of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, according to World Bank data, with almost 60% of those remittances coming from Russia. In the course of just a few months, the value of those remittances has been chopped in half. The results will be devastating.

Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News.

Russia’s Neighbors Scramble To Cope With Ruble’s Tribulations

Despite more than two decades of separation, the economies of the region remain deeply interconnected. Currencies throughout the region — from the Moldovan leu to the Kazakh tenge have seen drops in value of between 10 and 20 percent this year. Governments are watching with concern as their exports become increasingly expensive for customers in their giant neighbor.

Here’s how some of Russia’s neighbors are reacting to the ruble’s turbulence.

Russia's Neighbors Scramble To Cope With Ruble's Tribulations.

As Ruble Falls, Tajik Village Suffers

The Russian ruble has collapsed, but the effects are not only being felt in Russia. In the Tajik village of Eloki, marriages are being canceled and houses left half-built as remittances from migrant laborers dry up. Nearly every family has been affected — this is one family’s story. It was filmed when the ruble had lost around 40 percent of its value against the dollar, but before the dramatic plunge that shook markets on December 15-16. (RFE/RL)

 

As Ruble Falls, Tajik Village Suffers.