The Euromaidan protests that took place during winter 2013–2014, in Ukraine, have cast their shadow over Tajikistan. The short-term effect of the protests (particularly the Russian response), along with the increasingly violent and intractable nature of the civil war in Syria, makes comparable protests unlikely in Tajikistan in the near to medium term. However, this has not kept some from trying.
Earlier this month, the opposition figure Umarali Quvatov called for protests to take place in Dushanbe on October 10. Quvatov, the exiled leader of the now banned opposition organization “Group 24,” enjoys limited popularity, and the protests failed to materialize. Despite Quvatov’s lack of broad appeal, the government responded to his call by beefing up security in the capital and blocking websites and text message services. Some media outlets reported that President Emomali Rahmon even invited 800 Chinese troops into the capital to help suppress potential protests, although it remains unclear if these allegations are true or simply misinformation emanating from Quvatov and his camp (BBC Tajiki, October 13).
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Incidents this past year in the semi-autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan (see EDM, April 29) have demonstrated that the regime is willing to use lethal force to suppress public displays of dissent, which may further dampen the appetite for protest. One of the most widely cited reasons for the unlikelihood of protests is the fact that a significant percentage of Tajikistan’s military-age men live in Russia as migrant laborers. If this diversion of manpower does prove to be a crucial factor in forestalling protest movements in Tajikistan, it might prove a pyrrhic victory for the regime for three reasons:First, over the long run, the domestic economic hardships that drive Tajikistani laborers to Russia in search of work may exacerbate their underlying grievances against the regime. This would particularly be the case if a sudden change in Russian migration policy led to quotas or deportations that drastically reduced the number of Tajikistani migrants. Despite its reliance on cheap labor, Russia has a long history of threatening such actions as a way of extracting concessions from Dushanbe. A sudden and large repatriation of Tajikistani migrant labors with no means of supporting their families would have negative consequences for regime stability.
Second, long-term mass labor migration has considerable effects on Tajikistani social—and by extension—political dynamics. While regionalism, entrenched patronage networks, and loyalty to local strong men have hampered Rahmon’s ability to fully consolidate power in a centralized government, the existence of local power brokers do at least provide him with a finite (and familiar) number of interlocutors to deal with in times of crisis. Recent history is replete with examples of Rahmon using a combination of threats and inducements to compel local strong men to bring themselves (and their constituents) into line. Mass labor migration, however, may erode traditional patronage networks and regional identities, thereby degrading the ability of local strong men to “deliver” their constituents. The aforementioned Mirzohuja Ahmadov, who rejected calls for domestic street protests in Tajikistan, is a prime example of the trajectory of a regional war lord–turned Rahmon ally. A reader response to an interview with Ahmadov on Radio Free Europe’s Tajik-language website, however, is indicative of the potentially evolving sentiment of migrant laborers: “Mr. Ahmadov, do not speak for all of the Gharmis, I am a migrant in Moscow and I support Umarali Quvatov one hundred percent” (Ozodi, October 11). “Gharmis” refers to people who live in, or trace their lineage back to, the region of Gharm in Tajikistan.
And third, the process of de-regionalization and the leveling of local political hierarchies could be a force for good as it opens the door for competing political and religious ideas. However, recent reports of Tajikistani citizens being radicalized in Russia and recruited to fight with the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—ISIS) show how dangerous ideas can also metastasize in these communities (RFE/RL, October 2; see EDM August 7, 2013).
Since the start of the anti-government protests in Ukraine, and the ensuing Russian invasion of the country, the Ukraine crisis has raised a great deal of apprehension inside Tajikistan. And in large part due the population’s distrust of mass protests as a spark for anarchy, combined possibly with the large number of young Tajikistani men working in Russia, so far mass protest movements have not materialized. Yet, the country’s economic reliance on labor migration to Russia, the political effect of mass labor migration on traditional patronage networks, as well as concerns of greater ease of extremist ideology spreading through inter-mixed uprooted communities could help reverse this situation over the long term. All these factors call for more careful scrutiny, as it is possible that the reasons that have made Euromaidan-style protests in Tajikistan unlikely in the short term could lead to more radical and violent opposition in the medium to long term.
Category: Geography
Silk Road Reporters
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March, Western nations have imposed sanctions on Russia, including on its financial and energy sectors, as well as on a number of Russian nationals in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. In response, on Aug. 6 Putin imposed year-long food bans on the United States, European Union member states, Australia, Canada and Norway. Russia has also banned the transit of agricultural goods from Belarus and Kazakhstan following its embargo on EU food imports.
From the $43 billion of agricultural products Russia purchased abroad in 2013, $25 billion are now banned. According to Russian statistics, imports accounted for about 40 percent of household spending on food.
For the older Russian consumers this echoes memories of empty Soviet supermarkets, while the ban will likely spur inflation, currently hovering at about 7 percent this year.
BMC supported expeditions – what was achieved in 2014?
In 2014 the BMC International Committee awarded a total of £14,250 to 16 expeditions, and an additional three awards from the Julie Tullis Memorial fund. Supported trips visited South America, Greenland and various regions in Asia, with mixed success.
Notably, there were a number of ambitious projects, with some of our most talented climbers attempting objectives that could rightly be called “cutting edge” in current alpinisim.
In general the usual factors of weather and conditions prevented them achieving their goals.
But they were certainly not alone: compared to recent years, 2014 saw very few outstanding climbs accomplished in the world’s mountains.
British ascent of new peak in Tajikistan
Although forced to retreat from possibly the last remaining virgin 6,000er in the Muzkol Range, a four-member British expedition was able to make the first ascent of Peak 5,553m via a 1,200m route of Alpine D.
Supported with grants from the BMC, MEF, Alpine Club, Lowe Alpine, The Chris Walker Memorial Trust and the Austrian Alpine Club, Becky Coles, Rhys Huws, Simon Verspeak and John Vincent first flew to Kyrgyzstan, before travelling south along the Pamir Highway to Northeast Tajikistan and the Muzkol Range.
This collection of high arid mountains in the southeastern Pamir saw exploration in the Soviet era, and again in the mid to late 1990s and 2000, when it became the venue for a succession of Andrew Wielochowski’s commercial EWP expeditions.
These teams picked off the major summits but Peak 6,123m, to the west of Dvuglavy (6,148m) and rather more difficult of access, remained unclimbed.
Russia’s ruble collapse shakes Central Asian neighbours
While people in Moscow are already queueing outside foreign exchange shops to get rid of the ruble, eyeing the current 9.1% price inflation rate, neighbours of the “Russian bear” are likely trembling in fear.
Until a year ago, the Russian economy was flying high on the wings of a seemingly endless oil-fuelled boom, which showered economic migrants with hard cash to send back to their origin country. With the economic depression on the horizon and investors pulling their money out of the country by the billion each month, Russian companies have already started cutting wages and making redundancies.
Poor former Soviet republics with a troubled recent past like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are suffering the most. Millions of Tajik migrants live in Russia and send much of their salary back home. According to World Bank data, remittances in Tajikistan make up 42.1 % of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, making it the world’s biggest recipient.
A staggering 60% of those remittances come from Russia. If we consider that over a million Tajiks – half of the country’s workforce – work in the giant neighbouring country, we see why Russia’s incoming economic depression may potentially wreck those countries.
Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan is in a similarly desperate situation. The small mountainous state has a 32% share of GDP of remittances.
It has been calculated that Tajik growth will slow to 6.5% this year from 7.4% in 2013 as a result of the drop in worker remittances in the January-September period. Both Tajikistan, a state of 8 million, and Kyrgyzstan have a troubled post-soviet past. From 1992 to 1997, a civil war marred the prospect of economic growth in Tajikistan, which borders with Afghanistan and China.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan improve border co-operation – Central Asia Online
BISHKEK – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are working to reduce periodic disputes over scarce resources on their shared border.
Territorial claims, pastureland and water figure in many disputes, the Kyrgyz State Border Service (GPS) says, adding that it battles cross-border smuggling too. Aware of the potential for trouble, Kyrgyz and Tajik border forces confer regularly.
“In 2014, [they] met more than 80 times,” Gulmira Borubayeva, GPS spokeswoman, said. “They worked to resolve conflicts and clashes that occur in the border regions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.”
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan improve border co-operation – Central Asia Online.
Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat
Uzbekistan continues its quest to choke its two poorer neighbors’ plans to attain and secure energy independence. During an official visit to Kazakhstan late November, Uzbek President Islam Karimov made sure to bring up the “dangers” the hydropower plants Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want to build could pose. According to Karimov, the plans are “not coordinated with countries downstream,” i.e. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Flanked by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Karimov said, “We have affirmed our common position regarding the construction of new hydro technical facilities upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, which must strictly conform to recognized norms of international law and UN conventions as well as mandatory coordination with all countries located in the lower reaches of these rivers.”
Karimov conveniently forgets his administration bills Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for natural gas exports. Moreover, said gas is frequently shut off as a means of coercing the two countries, which are planning to build power-generating facilities on Central Asia’s two largest rivers. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling with not just a shortage but an absence of Uzbek gas, for most of 2014. Because mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sit high above sea level, harsh winters create shortages of already scarce electricity, and any insufficiency of Uzbek gas only makes the two countries more anxious to secure energy independence.
From Russia With Love?
Despite Tashkent’s tactics, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which together own nearly 70 percent of the waters that flow into the dwindling Aral Sea, remain deaf to Uzbekistan’s demands and warnings of “water wars.” This is thanks in part to Russia. The Kremlin has not only been voicing its support for plans to revive the Soviet-era projects, it has actually invested millions of dollars in the idea. Russian President Vladimir Putin personally travelled to Bishkek and Dushanbe, the two regional hosts of Russian military bases, to sign bilateral agreements to that effect. On top of Russia’s support, Tajikistan secured the World Bank’s “green light” for what is expected to be the tallest dam in the world: Rogun at 335 meters. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan was actually able to launch parts of a cascade of Russia-funded hydropower stations.
If giving money and throwing political support behind Kyrgyz and Tajik energy initiatives is the Kremlin’s carrot, the stick it may wish to use can hit both sides of the conflict. Toughening conditions for millions of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrant laborers in Russia, thereby indirectly forcing them to return to their homelands, is a tool Moscow has used frequently in the past. And this time around these migrants could thwart Uzbekistan’s attempts to prevent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from building dams. The sanctions the West slapped on Russia for Crimea and Ukraine have obvious implications for millions of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. On top of this, a report the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released in November suggests that falling prices of oil coupled with sanctions will negatively impact the Russian economy next year, sending shockwaves across Central Asia. These factors could lead some migrants to return from Russia, permanently.
The return of even a portion of the migrants to join the growing local populations would put Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under pressure. Ironically, therefore, both sides of the water conflict equally need it: Uzbekistan needs water to keep tens of thousands of returnees busy on agriculture fields, lest they voice discontent with the government’s inability to employ them, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need water to generate electricity to keep their own returning migrants from taking to the streets in protest. No sane Tajik or Kyrgyz politician would back down in the face of such challenges.
Resources: Curb vast water use in central Asia : Nature News & Comment
Shipwrecks rusting in the desert have come to symbolize the environmental havoc that has befallen the Aral Sea, which straddles Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. More than 90% of what was once the fourth-largest lake in the world has vanished in half a century1, 2, 3. The cracked shores are symptoms of the dramatic overuse of water in central Asia. Since the 1960s, 70% of Turkmenistan has become desert, and half of Uzbekistan’s soil has become salty owing to dust blown from the dry bed of the Aral Sea1.
The republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were developed as farming states to supply produce to the former Soviet Union1. Today, they are among the highest per capita users of water in the world — on average, each Turkmen consumes 4 times more water than a US citizen, and 13 times more than a Chinese one4(see ‘Top 20 consumers’). More than 90% of the region’s water use is irrigating thirsty crops including cotton and wheat1, 2.
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Like most other parts of the former Soviet Union, central Asian states suffer authoritarian rule and political fragility. Soaring unemployment is leading to a mass emigration of educated people. Current figures estimate that up to one-third of working-age Tajiks are employed abroad. Ethnic, political and religious diversity and difficulties with boundary demarcation fuel nationalism. Internal hostilities, as in the Caucasus, Moldova and eastern Ukraine, are a threat. A full-scale regional conflict, regardless of the rise of radical religious groups, is not out of the question.
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Resources: Curb vast water use in central Asia : Nature News & Comment.
Uzbekistan Seeks to Reinvigorate Diplomatic Clout In Region – Analysis – Eurasia Review
Since the fall of 2014, Tashkent has been boosting diplomatic engagement with its neighbors. In particular, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov met with President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan in Dushanbe on September 11 (press-service.uz September 13, 2014), and visited Turkmenistan on October 23–24 (press-service.uz October 25), and Kazakhstan on November 24–25 (press-service.uz November 26). Two critical issues have pushed Uzbekistan to reinvigorate its diplomatic efforts in its immediate neighborhood—the future of water and energy use in Central Asia, as well as the forthcoming pull-out of Western military forces from Afghanistan.
In July 2014, to Uzbekistan’s utter indignation, the World Bank’s Fifth and Final Riparian Meetings on Rogun Assessment Studies, held in Almaty, technically gave a green light to the construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Project in Tajikistan (worldbank.org, July 18). Appealing also on behalf of other downstream Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan found the World Bank study’s conclusions “unsatisfactory and insufficient to form a qualified opinion” and categorically affirmed that “Uzbekistan will never under any circumstances provide support for this project” (mfa.uz, August 1). Tashkent’s discontent was mainly twofold—construction work at the Rogun site was never halted, even as Tajikistan waited for the feasibility study’s conclusion, and the World Bank allegedly did not take into consideration Uzbekistan’s concerns over the project’s environmental implications or considered building a series of smaller hydro-power stations instead.
Interestingly, Tajikistan is the only case in which Uzbekistan seeks outside backing via multilateral and international engagement. Tashkent prefers to deal with all other countries and address issues of global politics on a bilateral basis. But the current tangle of contradictions regarding Central Asia’s water and energy resources has arisen due to the gradual dissolution of the Central Asian Power Grid System, from which the downstream states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan withdrew (the first in 2003, and the latter two in 2009) due to the upstream Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan both syphoning off electricity without due payment. This Grid System is still Central Asia’s most important energy and water dispatcher network, which links the entire region, and it functioned in central Tashkent throughout the Soviet period (Russiancouncil.ru, April 2, 2012). Consequently, not only has the transit of Turkmenistani electricity to Tajikistan and the shipment of Kyrgyzstani electricity to Kazakhstan been paralyzed, but the supply of electricity to Uzbekistan’s southern provinces has also partly malfunctioned due to the Grid System’s fragmentation.
Issues of water use and the energy deadlock are particularly acute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—even though bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Good-Neighborhood and Cooperation, and Eternal Friendship have been in force for decades among these three neighbors. Nonetheless, diverse national interests regarding the use of upstream hydro-power stations for energy by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as opposed to downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s use of the water for irrigation leads to serious regional conflicts. And this situation is further exacerbated by the downstream agrarian communities’ rampant inefficient water use (Nature.com, October 1).
Uzbekistan Seeks to Reinvigorate Diplomatic Clout In Region – Analysis – Eurasia Review.
OSCE provides training for Aarhus Centres and environmental NGOs in Tajikistan on raising awareness about disaster risk reduction | OSCE
DUSHANBE, 16 December 2014 – A two-day training course for Aarhus Centres and other non-governmental organizations on raising awareness of disaster risk reduction started today at the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. The training course will be delivered by national and international experts working in this field.
“It is not enough to simply invest in infrastructure to reduce the risk of natural disasters,” said Paul Hickey, Environmental Officer at the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. “We must encourage communities to make preventing and reducing the risk of natural disasters an integral part of their lives. The Aarhus Centres, with their proven ability to raise awareness on environmental issues, provide an ideal platform for building the knowledge of local communities in disaster risk reduction.”