Tajikistan – Page 2 – Tajikistan in Focus

Tajikistan Convicts IMU Members Who Planned To Fight In Syria

Tajiks in Syria

The State Committee for the National Security of Tajikistan said in November that there are around 300 Tajik citizens fighting in Syria.

However, the Tajik Interior Ministry has said that around 200 Tajiks are fighting in Syria and that around 50 had died.

Edward Lemon of the University of Exeter, who tracks Tajik fighters in Syria, told RFE/RL that he has found online evidence of 52 Tajik fighters in Syria.

The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, recently referred to Islamic State as “the plague of the new century and a global threat.”

Rahmon warned that Tajiks should “not underestimate the negative role of Islamic State in Tajikistan” and called on citizens to “not be indifferent, and to counter this global threat.”

Concerns over the threat posed by the Islamic State group in Central Asia were heightened after the regional militant Islamist IMU expressed its sympathy for Islamic State in September.

On September 26, IMU leader Usman Gazi published an online statement declaring the group was in “the same ranks with Islamic State in this continued war between Islam and [non-Muslims]. The Islamic State [group] is free from a patriotic or nationalist agenda…you can see Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Russians, and many English-speaking Muslim [foreign fighters] in its ranks.”

RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service reported on October 2 that it had received a statement and earlier audio recording from IMU leader Usmon Ghazi, in which the group commented on Syria.

In the wake of that report, RIA Novosti cited an Uzbek security source as saying that Tashkent authorities had “operational video and audio information about the IMU’s support and participation in joint military actions on the side of IS units.” The source said that the IMU had stepped up its recruitment and training in the Afghanistan and Pakistan regions.

— Joanna Paraszczuk

Tajikistan Convicts IMU Members Who Planned To Fight In Syria.

WHO/Europe | Photo story: Rehabilitating children with polio in Tajikistan

A WHO disability rehabilitation team in Tajikistan has been working with representatives of the International Society of Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO) to support the rehabilitation of people who contracted polio during a large outbreak of the disease in 2010

WHO/Europe | Photo story: Rehabilitating children with polio in Tajikistan.

Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat

Uzbekistan continues its quest to choke its two poorer neighbors’ plans to attain and secure energy independence. During an official visit to Kazakhstan late November, Uzbek President Islam Karimov made sure to bring up the “dangers” the hydropower plants Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want to build could pose. According to Karimov, the plans are “not coordinated with countries downstream,” i.e. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Flanked by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Karimov said, “We have affirmed our common position regarding the construction of new hydro technical facilities upstream of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, which must strictly conform to recognized norms of international law and UN conventions as well as mandatory coordination with all countries located in the lower reaches of these rivers.”

Karimov conveniently forgets his administration bills Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for natural gas exports. Moreover, said gas is frequently shut off as a means of coercing the two countries, which are planning to build power-generating facilities on Central Asia’s two largest rivers. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling with not just a shortage but an absence of Uzbek gas, for most of 2014. Because mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sit high above sea level, harsh winters create shortages of already scarce electricity, and any insufficiency of Uzbek gas only makes the two countries more anxious to secure energy independence.

From Russia With Love?

Despite Tashkent’s tactics, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which together own nearly 70 percent of the waters that flow into the dwindling Aral Sea, remain deaf to Uzbekistan’s demands and warnings of “water wars.” This is thanks in part to Russia. The Kremlin has not only been voicing its support for plans to revive the Soviet-era projects, it has actually invested millions of dollars in the idea. Russian President Vladimir Putin personally travelled to Bishkek and Dushanbe, the two regional hosts of Russian military bases, to sign bilateral agreements to that effect. On top of Russia’s support, Tajikistan secured the World Bank’s “green light” for what is expected to be the tallest dam in the world: Rogun at 335 meters. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan was actually able to launch parts of a cascade of Russia-funded hydropower stations.

If giving money and throwing political support behind Kyrgyz and Tajik energy initiatives is the Kremlin’s carrot, the stick it may wish to use can hit both sides of the conflict. Toughening conditions for millions of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrant laborers in Russia, thereby indirectly forcing them to return to their homelands, is a tool Moscow has used frequently in the past. And this time around these migrants could thwart Uzbekistan’s attempts to prevent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from building dams. The sanctions the West slapped on Russia for Crimea and Ukraine have obvious implications for millions of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. On top of this, a report the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released in November suggests that falling prices of oil coupled with sanctions will negatively impact the Russian economy next year, sending shockwaves across Central Asia. These factors could lead some migrants to return from Russia, permanently.

The return of even a portion of the migrants to join the growing local populations would put Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under pressure. Ironically, therefore, both sides of the water conflict equally need it: Uzbekistan needs water to keep tens of thousands of returnees busy on agriculture fields, lest they voice discontent with the government’s inability to employ them, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need water to generate electricity to keep their own returning migrants from taking to the streets in protest. No sane Tajik or Kyrgyz politician would back down in the face of such challenges.

Central Asia’s Hydropower Spat | The Diplomat.

Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News

The meltdown of Russia’s currency, brought on by falling oil prices, collapsing confidence in the central government, and international financial sanctions, is now manifesting itself as a panic. It’s “the most incredible currency collapse I think I have ever seen in the 17 years in the market, and 26 years covering Russia,” wrote Timothy Ash, Standard Bank’s head of emerging market research, in a note this morning. “No one expected the ruble to hit 60 this year against the dollar, let alone 70 or 80 even. And no one is positioned for this. This will impart huge short term damage to Russia.”

And the reverberations will be felt beyond the country’s borders, globally, but most acutely by its neighbors, where the oil-fueled Russian boom of the last decade has rained cash upon exporters and economic migrants alike.

Consider Tajikistan. Remittances — cash sent home from citizens working abroad — make up 42% of the Central Asian republic’s GDP, according to World Bank data, with almost 60% of those remittances coming from Russia. In the course of just a few months, the value of those remittances has been chopped in half. The results will be devastating.

Russia’s Meltdown Will Shake The World, From Tajikistan To Tokyo – BuzzFeed News.

Russia’s Neighbors Scramble To Cope With Ruble’s Tribulations

Despite more than two decades of separation, the economies of the region remain deeply interconnected. Currencies throughout the region — from the Moldovan leu to the Kazakh tenge have seen drops in value of between 10 and 20 percent this year. Governments are watching with concern as their exports become increasingly expensive for customers in their giant neighbor.

Here’s how some of Russia’s neighbors are reacting to the ruble’s turbulence.

Russia's Neighbors Scramble To Cope With Ruble's Tribulations.

As Ruble Falls, Tajik Village Suffers

The Russian ruble has collapsed, but the effects are not only being felt in Russia. In the Tajik village of Eloki, marriages are being canceled and houses left half-built as remittances from migrant laborers dry up. Nearly every family has been affected — this is one family’s story. It was filmed when the ruble had lost around 40 percent of its value against the dollar, but before the dramatic plunge that shook markets on December 15-16. (RFE/RL)

As Ruble Falls, Tajik Village Suffers.

Resources: Curb vast water use in central Asia : Nature News & Comment

Shipwrecks rusting in the desert have come to symbolize the environmental havoc that has befallen the Aral Sea, which straddles Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. More than 90% of what was once the fourth-largest lake in the world has vanished in half a century^1, 2, 3. The cracked shores are symptoms of the dramatic overuse of water in central Asia. Since the 1960s, 70% of Turkmenistan has become desert, and half of Uzbekistan’s soil has become salty owing to dust blown from the dry bed of the Aral Sea¹.

The republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were developed as farming states to supply produce to the former Soviet Union¹. Today, they are among the highest per capita users of water in the world — on average, each Turkmen consumes 4 times more water than a US citizen, and 13 times more than a Chinese one⁴(see ‘Top 20 consumers’). More than 90% of the region’s water use is irrigating thirsty crops including cotton and wheat^1, 2.

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Like most other parts of the former Soviet Union, central Asian states suffer authoritarian rule and political fragility. Soaring unemployment is leading to a mass emigration of educated people. Current figures estimate that up to one-third of working-age Tajiks are employed abroad. Ethnic, political and religious diversity and difficulties with boundary demarcation fuel nationalism. Internal hostilities, as in the Caucasus, Moldova and eastern Ukraine, are a threat. A full-scale regional conflict, regardless of the rise of radical religious groups, is not out of the question.

Uzbekistan Seeks to Reinvigorate Diplomatic Clout In Region – Analysis – Eurasia Review

Since the fall of 2014, Tashkent has been boosting diplomatic engagement with its neighbors. In particular, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov met with President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan in Dushanbe on September 11 (press-service.uz September 13, 2014), and visited Turkmenistan on October 23–24 (press-service.uz October 25), and Kazakhstan on November 24–25 (press-service.uz November 26). Two critical issues have pushed Uzbekistan to reinvigorate its diplomatic efforts in its immediate neighborhood—the future of water and energy use in Central Asia, as well as the forthcoming pull-out of Western military forces from Afghanistan.

In July 2014, to Uzbekistan’s utter indignation, the World Bank’s Fifth and Final Riparian Meetings on Rogun Assessment Studies, held in Almaty, technically gave a green light to the construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Project in Tajikistan (worldbank.org, July 18). Appealing also on behalf of other downstream Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan found the World Bank study’s conclusions “unsatisfactory and insufficient to form a qualified opinion” and categorically affirmed that “Uzbekistan will never under any circumstances provide support for this project” (mfa.uz, August 1). Tashkent’s discontent was mainly twofold—construction work at the Rogun site was never halted, even as Tajikistan waited for the feasibility study’s conclusion, and the World Bank allegedly did not take into consideration Uzbekistan’s concerns over the project’s environmental implications or considered building a series of smaller hydro-power stations instead.

Interestingly, Tajikistan is the only case in which Uzbekistan seeks outside backing via multilateral and international engagement. Tashkent prefers to deal with all other countries and address issues of global politics on a bilateral basis. But the current tangle of contradictions regarding Central Asia’s water and energy resources has arisen due to the gradual dissolution of the Central Asian Power Grid System, from which the downstream states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan withdrew (the first in 2003, and the latter two in 2009) due to the upstream Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan both syphoning off electricity without due payment. This Grid System is still Central Asia’s most important energy and water dispatcher network, which links the entire region, and it functioned in central Tashkent throughout the Soviet period (Russiancouncil.ru, April 2, 2012). Consequently, not only has the transit of Turkmenistani electricity to Tajikistan and the shipment of Kyrgyzstani electricity to Kazakhstan been paralyzed, but the supply of electricity to Uzbekistan’s southern provinces has also partly malfunctioned due to the Grid System’s fragmentation.

Issues of water use and the energy deadlock are particularly acute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—even though bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Good-Neighborhood and Cooperation, and Eternal Friendship have been in force for decades among these three neighbors. Nonetheless, diverse national interests regarding the use of upstream hydro-power stations for energy by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as opposed to downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s use of the water for irrigation leads to serious regional conflicts. And this situation is further exacerbated by the downstream agrarian communities’ rampant inefficient water use (Nature.com, October 1).

Uzbekistan Seeks to Reinvigorate Diplomatic Clout In Region – Analysis – Eurasia Review.

Voter Education Campaign in Tajikistan | OSCE

Before Tajikistan’s presidential elections in 2013, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, in co-operation with the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda conducted a door-to-door, person-to-person voter education campaign throughout the country. The campaign targeted women and potential first-time voters. From 22 October until 4 November, 60 voter educators reached 115,037 voters explaining procedures for casting a ballot and that proxy voting is prohibited.

Voter Education Campaign in Tajikistan | OSCE.

Breaking the Vase: How women are becoming border guards in Central Asia and Afghanistan | OSCE

The ‘vase’ has been slowly shattering in many countries as law enforcement agencies, somewhat hesitatingly, have opened their doors to women. Border police services are arguably one of the last outposts reluctant to include women in their ranks. The reluctance has often been mutual, with few women relishing postings away from home and family, in isolated and hostile locations, working for long periods alongside large numbers of men.

The strategic shift from viewing border guards as responsible for defence of the state to protection of citizens – and thereby easing the ‘unhampered flow’ of goods, persons and services – has demanded not only reform and expansion but inclusivity. Representative law enforcement institutions have become an operational necessity.

The 21st century has witnessed a massive increase in mobility and the numbers of labour migrants, with more women crossing borders primarily for trade and employment but also for education, marriage and adventure. The vast majority, looking for employment opportunities and the doorway to a better life for their families, are among the poorest, the least educated and skilled women, with limited employment options.

In May 2014, the OSCE Border Management Staff College introduced its first all-women staff course. The course content included the standard topics ranging from management models to information-sharing, migration, human trafficking and smuggling, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption measures, conflict management and leadership. There was also a two-day Train the Trainers session and a requirement for group research and presentation on selected topics.

Participants included twenty-five mid and senior-level female officers of the border, customs and drug control agencies of Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania and Tajikistan.

Breaking the Vase: How women are becoming border guards in Central Asia and Afghanistan | OSCE.